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IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANA ADVERSE POS-
SESSION ACT OF 1927
ALBERT H. GAvIT*
At its 1927 session, the Indiana Legislature enacted:
"SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the State of
Indiana, that hereafter in any suit to establish title to lands or real estate
no possession thereof shall be deemed adverse to the owner in such manner
as to establish title or rights in and to such land or real estate unless such
adverse possessor or claimant shall have paid and discharged all taxes and
special assessments of every nature falling due on such land or real estate
during the period he claims to have possessed the same adversely: pro-
vided, however, that nothing in this act shall relieve any adverse possessor
or claimant from proving all the elements of title by adverse possession
now required by law."l
Two commentators who, in their words, are "presently inter-
ested" in litigation involving this act challenge this legislation
in an article in the November issue of the Indiana Law Journal.2
The act in question adds to the elements of adverse possession
of land a further attribute: that the adverse possessor must
have paid the taxes and assessments thereon during the period
of his adverse occupancy thereof. In so doing, it is far from
the novel and revolutionary step indicated in the article in ques-
tion, as similar legislative provisions exist in at least eleven of
our states.3
The article in question discussed the subject under five divis-"
ions, to-wit: 1. Its constitutionality. 2. Its effect on the squatter,
3. Its effect on line encroachments, 4. Its effect on easements, and
5. Its adjectival effect in proceedings.
A like treatment will here be pursued:
I.
ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY.
The constitutionality of the act post-actively being conceded
in the article, discussion to that effect will not be indulged.
* See p. 336 for biographical note.
1 Chapter 42, Acts 1927 Indiana Legislature.
2 Indiana Law Journal, November, 1928, Vol. IV, p. 112 et seq.
a Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Washington and West Virginia. See 2 C. J. 203 and note 9.
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II.
ITS EFFECT ON THE SQUATTER.
It is argued in the article in question that the act applies only
if the adverse possessor takes the offensive and seeks to assert
title, and that it affords no aid to a record owner in his action
to quiet title; that is, if the adverse possessor chooses to remain
on the defensive and not himself assert title, the true owner is
to find no assistance in the act.
To arrive at such a position, the authors read into the act the
italicized portion of "Hereafter in any suit by an adverse pos-
sessor of lands to establish title," whereas the statute itself
contains no such limitation but broadly provides: "Hereafter in
any suit to establish . . ."
Such general language in the act was obviously intended to
cover both offensive and defensive efforts by either the squatter
or the record owner. The act affords the squatter neither a
cause of action, nor a defense to one by the record owner, unless
the adverse possessor has paid the taxes and assessments.
"Hereafter in any suit . .. " is too broad and general a state-
ment to permit of the construction contended for. Any suit
means a suit by any person, be he true owner or otherwise. The
act purports to cover all litigation on the subject no matter by
whom brought and contains no exceptions. It is therefore dif-
ficult to believe that, in the face of such ambiguous language
the courts would hold it applicable only to those cases where
the squatter sues.
Any such construction would be in clear disregard of the
evident intent of the legislature as expressed in the most gen-
eral terms at its command, and would necessitate judicial legis-
lation of the most flagrant sort.
The further contention is made that since the act provides a
rule for "suits to establish title . . ." that it will be limited to
actions to quiet title alone and that ejectment actions will be
excluded. In other words, it appears to be urged that although
under this act a court decreed the record owner to be the true
owner free from any claim of the adverse possessor that it would
be powerless to mould a judgment awarding possession to the
successful party, provided only the squatter had had twenty
years adverse possession without the payment of taxes.
To say the least, any such construction of the act would be
technical to the degree of absurdity. Such reasoning, if ever
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it had a place in the law, passed with our abolishment of the
common-law forms of actions and the enactment of our Code.
It is unthinkable that any court would decree that a squatter
was in possession of another's land without right and at the
same time hold that it was powerless to afford possessory relief.
The legislature itself has spoken on this very subject and has
provided that the same rules apply to ejectment and to quieting
title cases.4 Likewise, the courts have so held, as evidenced by
Trittip v. Morgan, 99 Ind. 269, 270, where it said: "The pro-
visions on the subject of quieting title and recovering possession
are too closely interwoven to be separated."
Even on the reasoning of the commentators in the November
article, the act would not be inoperative in possessory actions.
The record owner would first quiet his title, and then, using that
decree as an adjudication that the other's possession was with-
out right, would bring an action in ejectment.
Certainly, the principle that in one and the same action the
courts will afford a suitor all the relief to which he is entitled,
is too firmly entrenched in our code and decisions, for any such
contention as is urged against the act in question ever to find
judicial support.
III.
The article in question urges that since (as asserted) many
buildings in Indiana, through inaccurate surveys, encroach a few
inches on adjoining lands, that any legislation is unwise that
does not give the encroacher, as a premium for his mistake, a
fee ownership of his neighbor's land.
To begin with, the statute is not retroactive, and the errors
of the old surveyors and platters that have heretofore ripened
into titles, are not affected.
Second, with the improvements in surveying methods and
equipment, it is a rare case that encroachments innocently occur
on large or important building projects.
Third, security of titles is admittedly to be desired, and such
result is more likely to be achieved by a definite legislative rule
that holds a man to his own platted and recorded boundaries
than does a rule that encourages courts from time to time to
change those boundaries upon conflicting oral proof as to the
past line of occupancy. It is better that boundaries be fixed by
4 Burns R. S. 1926, Section 1155.
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plat- (a method permitting of definite and accurate calculation
at any time)-than that an owner be forever subject to the
risk of some court fixing a jagged, meandering line, now on one
side of the true line, now on the other, changing as each ad-
joining owner inadvertently trespasses on the other's lands for
the statutory period.
If relief is to be given for the class of encroachments com-
plained of in the article, it might better be done under the
occupying claimant's acts than by holding that the trespasser
acquires title without any compensation whatever being paid
therefor.
It is submitted that the law should be construed to prevent
the very thing the authors contend for-the acquiring of titles
through slight encroachments that arose through error and mis-
take of the very party now making claim to title. Normally
the law puts the burdens of a man's mistakes on himself and
to apply that rule to encroachments does no violence to the gen-
eral principles of equity. If hardship is to result from mistakes
of survey, they may well be placed on the party responsible for
the error rather than upon the adjoining owner who is free from
fault.
The middle paragraph on page 117 of the article in question
states that the authors are "presently interested" in a case in
which a cemetery association had occupied a part of another's
lands for nearly twenty years before the passage of the act
without the payment of any taxes thereon. Complaint is made
that since the adjoining owner might have acquired the ceme-
tery's lands without paying taxes (since they are tax exempt),
that a rule is unjust which sets a different standard for lands
that are not tax exempt.
Necessarily, any law relating to adverse possession may work
inequalities between adjoining owners. For example, adverse
possession runs in favor of the state but not against it, and if
my lands adjoin those of the state, I can never gain any of its
lands by adversely possessing them, but it may gain title to a
part or all of mine by similar possession.
The proportion of tax exempt lands to those not exempt is so
small as to be negligible, and, even were we to assume that in
the one case in a thousand involving a state of facts similar to
their cemetery case that this act is unfair, we should still be far
short of a just indictment of the statute as applied generally.
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If one is able to overlook the fact in the authors' cemetery
case that it was the cemetery and not the adjoining owner who
made the mistake as to boundary, it might be suggested that
the solution to their problem may lie in the branch of law
dealing with easements rather than with fee ownership by
adverse possession.
IV.
ITS EFFECT ON EASEMENTS.
Under the above subdivision the article under discussion
urges that, for all practical purposes an easement can never be
acquired under the Adverse Possession Act, because of the fact
that it is only in the rarest cases that the easement is assessed
for tax purposes separate from the fee, and that therefore the
claimant of a prescriptive right by adverse possession will but
rarely be able to comply with the requirement that he pay all
taxes on the interest he claims in the land.
Their reasoning is again superficial. If there are no taxes
assessed against the easement, then a prescriptive right to the
same may be acquired by the statutory period of user without
the payment of taxes. That which is not assessed for taxation,
either by reason of being exempt or otherwise (as in the case
of their cemetery lands), may be acquired without the payment
of taxes.
Investigation of the authorities under adverse possession
legislation requiring the payment of taxes, affirms the above
reasoning. Thus in Johnson v. Knott,5 the defendant claimed
a right to drive piling upon plaintiff's lands to aid in the opera-
tion of a ferry and proved the statutory period of user thereof.
The plaintiff replied that defendant's failure to pay the taxes
prevented a prescriptive right accruing. The court disposed
of the above contention as follows:
"I do not understand that the occupation extended over the entire
premises in dispute, but that it consisted in maintaining the piling before
referred to, and was insisted upon more in the nature of right to exercise
the privilege than a claim to title to the land. Under that view, the general
ownership of the land might be in the appellant and the respondent entitled
only to an easement, in which case, the payment of taxes by the former
would not be inconsistent with the alleged right of the latter. One person
may have a liberty, privilege or advantage in the land of another for a
special purpose arising out of grant or prescription, and a grant would be
5 13 Oregon 308, 10 Pacific 418.
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presumed upon the adverse user of such right for a period equal to the
statute of limitations. From the evidence shown by the bill of exceptions
I would infer that it was the use by the respondent of the premises, in the
particular way mentioned, for the period of time claimed, upon which
their plea of the statute of limitations was founded. In that case, it would
be immaterial whether the appellant paid the taxes or not, as the owner-
ship of the premises subject to such right would be in him."
Likewise, in considering this problem, the Supreme Court of
California in Humphreys v. Blasingame,6 where a right of way
was involved, held:
"Plaintiff's use of the way under a claim of right was necessarily hos-
tile, but it need not amount to an ouster or exclusion of the defendant from
a right to use the way. The use of the way, if without right, is a trespass,
which would have given the defendant a right of action, and that is all that
is necessary to set the statute running, so far as a right of action is con-
cerned," (cases cited), "so the payment of taxes is necessary to the suc-
cessful assertion of title by adverse possession as provided now by statute;
but that requirement does not apply to a mere easement, which is not sep-
arately assessed for the purpose of taxation."
V.
ITS ADJECTIVAL EFFECT IN PROCEEDINGS.
The above captioned division of the subject is disclosed upon
reading to be a caution that the act be narrowly construed and
to urge that the courts limit the act, by judicial construction,
to a defensive aid to the record owner in suits brought by the
adverse possessor io quiet title.
Earlier in their article, the authors had contended that from
its own words the act necessarily must be so construed, a posi-
tion now tacitly abandoned for one of entreaty to the courts
that they so construe it.
As heretofore shown the act is not susceptible of any such
narrow construction. It was intended to, and does, by its very
words, apply to any suit to establish title, and this, of course,
means whether brought by the record owner or the adverse pos-
sessor.
The act is neither novel nor unworkable. It has been tried
in nearly one-fourth of our states, was designed to meet a real
need in Indiana generally, it affords security and certainty of
titles and boundary lines and removes from the field of litigation
what has heretofore been a fertile source of controversy.
6104 Cal. 40, 87 Pacific 804.
